

One of the 70,000 mines that blocked the Northern entrance
to the North Sea
What every American industry did in the war is of interest to the American people. What a particular industry did is of even keener interest to those engaged in it, and to those with whom they have relations.
Furthermore, every industry owes it to itself to record for the benefit of posterity the part it played in the greatest struggle that ever tested the moral fibre of mankind.
For these reasons this booklet has been prepared by one of those
American institutions which had a part in supplying the wire rope
needs of the Allies.
JOHN A. ROEBLING'S SONS CO. TRENTON, N. J.
March 1, 1920
Extracts an article by Captain Reginald R. Belknap, U.S.N.,
Commander of the U. S. Mine-laying Squadron. From the Scsentific
American, March 15-22, 1919.
In Admiral Sims' address, just before the American Mine-laying
Squadron left Portland, England, for home, he said, "After
we came into the war we designed a mine, built it, equipped the
mine layers, sent them over to this side, and planted more mines
in less space of time than any nation in the world ever thought
of doing before-one of the finest stunts the Navy has accomplished
on this side.
Reducing a new invention to practice in a few months is no small
problem, especially when it is a mine to be planted much deeper,
and over bottom 100 fathoms deeper than ever before-yet this had
to be done to meet the enemy's submarine campaign, the most serious
menace to the cause of America and the Allies.
Briefly, the project was for the United States and British mining
forces to co-operate in establishing a mine-field barrier across
the North Sea between Scotland and Norway. The mine-field would
measure 230 miles long by 25 average width, consist of 70,000
mines in "systems," each comprising one or more lines
of mines near the surface, other mines deeper, and yet more, deeper
still, so as to bar or imperil the passing of any vessel, whether
on the surface or submerged.
The terms "impossible" and "foolish" were
freely applied to the scheme. Contracts for 100,000 mines would
have to be let, and tens of millions more spent outright, both
here and in Great Britain, based on test of the mine only by parts,
since a complete new mine did not yet exist. But in spite of the
several elements of uncertainty, the undertaking had the unqualified
approval of everyone in authority, from the President down.
Secrecy, as well as haste, necessitated dividing the construction
of the mine among 500 contractors and sub-contractors. Parts manufactured
in different places were sent to a third place for joining, and
all were finally sent to Norfolk, Virginia, whence they were shipped
to Scotland, where the mines would be assembled complete for the
first time, ready for planting. The mine spheres were charged
with high explosive at a plant near Norfolk, containing large
steam kettles, which poured 300 pounds of molten TNT into each
sphere. In this quiet corner the sailors worked in constant danger
from fire and the poisonous fumes of the molten explosive. Several
were seriously overcome and one died from the effects, but the
rest stuck to it through the long, hot summer.
To carry the mine material over, small steamers were chosen to
minimize the effect on the operation in case of loss. One, the
"Lake Moor," was sunk by a submarine in April, with
forty-one of her crew, making almost the only loss of life in
the whole operation. They had capacity of 2,000 to 3,000 tons
and carried 1,200 to 1,800 mines, besides stores of various kinds.
Our mine-laying squadron and bases were supplied almost entirely
from America, obtaining abroad little more than fuel, fresh meat
and vegetables. There were twenty-four of these carrier steamers
constantly employed, from February on, two or three sailings every
eight days.
Before the first system of the barrier was half way across the
North Sea, reports of damage to the enemy began to come in. This
was in early July, and before October ten submarines had been
destroyed in the barrier and probably many more. From the very
circumstances in that vicinity, the actual toll may never be known.
The latest report is that the Germans admit twenty-three lost
there and other authorities ascribe the fleet's surrender and
the final armistice largely to the defeat of the submarine campaign
which the Northern Mine Barrage forced the enemy to accept.

The North Sea Mine Barrage

Loading mines on scows to be transferred to ships of the
mine-laying squadron
The whole amazing episode of the North Sea Mine Barrage which, with its 70,000 bottled volcanoes, made that historic water a graveyard for German hopes, was hidden from general knowledge, even down to the removal, by the "smokescreen" of secrecy which is traditional in the Navy.
While the armies in all theatres swayed back and forth in the
world struggle, the spot-light of publicity never left them.

A loose mine astern of a mine sweeper
"MUM" WAS THE NAVY'S WATCHWORD
The navies, others as well as our own, did their work, some great,
some small, but all important, in the dark so far as public knowledge
was concerned.
The naval specialty was keeping still about it.
Not until the "moving finger" had written failure across
the German plans was any whisper allowed to escape regarding the
great work that was done in making the submarine warfare ineffective.
What makes it still more impressive is that the work of creating
the barrage involved so many men and so many classes of men. Thousands
of heads and hands were at work helping to put it through, but
it remained a secret until the job was done.
Now that the last steel-jacketed bundle of TNT has been gathered
up and put out of commission, making the sea again a pathway for
peaceful commerce, there are many things which may be revealed
as part of the record of the accomplishment, which add to its
magnitude and its value.
THE FATE OF THE WORLD HUNG BY A WIRE ROPE
The fate of the world, for example, may have hung by a thread
at times during the crowded years of the war, but it hung by a
wire rope pretty nearly all the time.
Wire rope has come to be so much of a commonplace in the everyday
work of the world that it is taken for granted. To the man in
the street it has no dramatic value. People accept it as a matter
of course.
There is a thrill in the picture, and even in the thought of men
and ships sowing a perilous seaway with high explosive so thickly
that a fish would be ill-advised to navigate it.
The devising and the laying of this deadly barrier, with all it
meant, will go down in history as a deed of signal ingenuity and
daring, and its removal as a desperately ticklish job, done with
conspicuous efficiency. But who can write a poem or even a rip-roaring
chantey about wire rope?
WIRE ROPE IN THE NORTH SEA BARRAGE
Wire rope, in the epic of the North Sea Barrage, sounds like an incidental, but an outline of the part it played will be of interest to many and will illustrate, as perhaps nothing else could do, the devotion and
efficiency, in a thousand fields, of the thousands of men behind
the men behind the mines. In these days of overpowering numerals
probably even the figures of wire rope in the war will be read
without leaving any clear impression of the unbelievable work
they register.
EIGHTY MILLION FEET
OF WIRE ROPE
Men who through a good part of their lives have been accustomed
to see wire rope on every street and in every mill and every hardware
store, may not be greatly impressed by the statement that the
North Sea project required approximately eighty million feet of
rope. To say that the total war requirement of this country was
more than two hundred million feet is no more convincing.
But when one stops to think, by way of preliminary, that the rope
used for war purposes was in large measure special sizes, special
quality and tests, and that it was nearly all excess over normal
production, and, furthermore, that during the time it was being
produced no industry in the United States was compelled to go
without;--the magnitude of the operation which produced it begins
to be suggested.
Without wire rope, in quantities and at a rate of production hitherto
undreamed of, the German might today have been dining in the Cafe de la Paix
or the Cheshire Cat. Certainly the task of closing the North Sea
to German submersibles and to other enemy ships as well, could
not have been undertaken, much less accomplished.

Trucking bottled volcanoes at a mine assembling plant>
A WORK OF UNDREAMED OF MAGNITUDE DONE AT TOP SPEED
The same may be said with truth of other factors in this and divers
war operations, but the swiftness with which the barrage project
was executed, the brief time allowed for the fulfillment of unheard
of demands, the small number of plants in which the work had to
be done, many of them far from the point of shipment, the highly
specialized equipment and processes employed in the manufacture,
all go to make the story of wire rope, in connection with both
the laying and removal of the barrage, one of deep industrial
and patriotic interest.
When, in the spring of 1918, the Yankee mine layers were sowing
the troubled waters between Norway and the Orkneys with three-hundred
pound cases of death and destruction at the rate, when at actual
work, of one every twelve seconds, it is doubtful if even they
stopped to think what it meant in brains and money and time and
energy and native honesty and patriotism to produce on time, and
in record time, the twelve hundred feet of rope that went out
of sight with every mine.
BURYING 6,000,000 FEET OF ROPE IN EACH MINING EXCURSION
Each mining excursion carried and buried six million feet of
rope. Like the men who ran the ships and those who dropped the
mines, every foot of it did its American duty, and the record
of the undertaking showed that exacting science and unsparing
severity in rejection had made the product practically perfect
in spite of all difficulties.
It is unpleasant to think what would have happened if the fine-drawn
plummet cords had been defective, or to consider the halt that
would have been called to the whole operation if in the later
"excursions" the mooring cables had not been ready on
the dot and equal to the work they had to do. There were no loose
American mines afloat in the North Sea, no mines that did not
function, and when the end came and the barrier had to be removed,
all were swept up intact. The Navy proved a hundred per cent in
time and quality, and so did the rope. Both were a credit to the
country that produced them.

IT WAS ALL UP TO AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS
When the barrage project, which the British and many who were not British counted impossible, was finally decided on, the question of stupendous manufacture confronted the Government. England and the Continent, both overburdened, could not help. It was all up to the American manufacturers.
Mechanically complex as the American mine had come to be, with
its varied improvements to increase sensitivity and destructiveness,
the problem of construction was in some parts easily solved. By
curtailing the automobile industry the mine cases and anchor boxes
were supplied promptly and in quantity; contraction of building
and electrical construction supplied the electrical devices and
trip hooks vital to high effectiveness.
But the wire rope makers had to shoulder the whole burden of their huge task without curtailing the multitude of war industries whose needs were equally imperative. For in the meantime all the multifarious activities in which wire rope is employed were forging ahead in a fever of war production.
ROPE AND STILL MORE ROPE DEMANDED
The demand for coal and metals never ceased; the mines of coal and copper needed
more rope instead of less. The oil industries had to have rope for drilling and pumping and bailing.
Manufacturing plants were running overtime, calling daily for
more rope for power transmission, cranes, hoists and slings.
The lumber camps were demanding larger supply in their effort
to get unprecedented quantities of logs to the rail lines, and
the shipyards-old ones being extended and enormous new ones being
built-could not live without rope in staggering quantities.
Hog Island alone had to have five million feet before it could turn out a ship.
Railroads, elevators, contractors, steel mills, army, navy-all
the productive and constructive industries of the country clamored
in every mail for more wire rope.
AND THEN-THE DELUGE
No one has yet begun to forget the conditions that prevailed in
every form of manufacture at that time. The thirteen makers of
wire rope will never forget it. Sole producers of a commodity
without which a mechanical war could not go on any more than it
could without guns and powder and ships and men, they received,
in January, 1918, an order to produce for the Mine Barrage, at
almost superhuman speed, 78,000,000 feet of special rope, in addition
to the load they were carrying. It was like ordering the Atlantic
Fleet to go in and take Heligoland.
But by May first they had made and shipped, without flaw and without
a single delay, rope of various sizes and specifications designed
solely for this work and subject to the most exhaustive tests,
to equip and anchor a hundred thousand mines.
This was not turning out standard trade stuff for which they were
equipped. It was all "different." There was one rope
for the hoisting gear, another for the plummet cord, another for
slings, another for ignition cord, another for anchors and so
on.
With all these the maximum of strength and the minimum of weight was essential, and the equipment of the factories was not, in the main, adapted to the type of product contemplated. Production was sharply reduced when a plant which had been making inch and a half cable was set to work on a fine rope measuring but seven-sixteenths of an inch. This situation called for material transfer of equipment.
In addition, the Roebling Company, Trenton, N. J., one of the
largest producers, had suffered, by presumably incendiary fires
in 1914 and 1915, the loss of two of its largest buildings and
faced the new demand with a reduction of fifty per cent in its
previous equipment.

The mine-laying squadron in action
It was fortunate, to the end of undoing the Hun, that the wire
rope industry from the very beginning of the war had learned to
pick up loads on short notice and pack them without losing headway.
Prior to 1917 it had manufactured in large volume for the Allies,
and upon America's entrance into the war, the American Iron and
Steel Institute, at the request of the Government, formed a committee
for the handling and distribution of wire rope. This committee
consisted of Karl G. Roebling, of John A. Roebling's Sons Company,
Trenton, Chairman; Frank Baackes, General Sales Agent of the American
Steel and Wire Company, Trenton; and John L. Broderick, of the
firm of Broderick & Bascom, of St. Louis.
The rope makers were called together, the known requirements of
the Government explained to them, and data taken on prospective
supply of materials. Beginning May 15, 1917, all Government requirements
were sent to the sub-committee to be allotted to the various plants
on a basis of production.
NO TIME TO CONSIDER THE CLOCK
From that time on, neither the members of the committee nor anyone
else connected with the wire rope business, had time to consider
the clock. But when the hour of the armistice struck every demand
had been met on time, and the productive capacity of the wire
manufactories had been increased nearly one hundred per cent.
When the big demand of the Navy for the Mine Barrage came, the
organization had been schooled in doing the impossible..
To facilitate the distribution of wire and thus hasten production,
a sub-committee had been formed by the Institute, with Frank Baackes
of the American Steel and Wire Company as its chairman. The close
co-operation of these committees in the allotment of requirements
and the prompt provision of wire of which the smaller manufacturers
were not producers, was a decisive factor in meeting the demand.
The rest was work-ceaseless, driving and conscientious.

A mine finding its position at the desired depth
below the surface of the sea
WIRE ROPE IS MADE WITH A CONSCIENCE
Even in the everyday business of the world, the uses to which
wire rope are put are pre-eminently those in which the lives and
safety of people are constantly at hazard. It is a commodity which
cannot be skimped and in which superficial appearance is of no
value. Its making involves a stern moral responsibility, and even
in the conduct of peace-time manufacture carelessness or parsimony
would spell commercial disaster and public reprobation. Wire rope
simply has to be made on honor.
The demands of the war intensified this responsibility, since
on the perfection of the product hung the lives of our own soldiers
and sailors, and, in the last analysis, the outcome of the war.
TWENTY-SIX OPERATIONS IN MANUFACTURE
Wire rope, when it is delivered to the consumer, has passed through
twenty-six distinct operations in the making, and at every step
of its progress the maker has the alternative of taking a chance
on the cheap and easy way, the alternative of dodging the standard
or living up to it. The record of the service throughout the war
bears ample testimony to the way in which the work of the American
factories was done, from the first process to the last.
There is romance in the making of steel, in steel itself, which
fairly outdoes half the fiction; but when from the iron ore the
various steps have all been taken which lead to the production
of the steel ingot, the story of wire rope is barely begun. From
beginning to end, even from the ore stage, it is a story of complex
chemistry and rigid rejection of all save the very cream of the
material. It is treatment after treatment to eliminate content
and conditions by which any element of weakness may creep into
the finished product, and there are opportunities all along the
way.
ASKING THE UTMOST OF STEEL
But there is steel, and steel. The layman doesn't know this. To
him steel is a ponderous generality. The steel girder that goes
to make the frame of a skyscraper, the rail that carries a world's
commerce-steel in its million everyday uses is only a cousin to
the aristocratic stuff that must be singled out for the making
of wire rope, with its everlasting tests for tensile strength,
elongation, torsion and bending, and every other tax that can
be laid upon it, including, at the last, the surety of safety
to human life.
Just plain everyday steel won't do. And so scrupulous are the
makers in the rejection of unsuitable material that when the ingot
has been reduced to wire ready for the ropeshop, forty-two per
cent of it has gone to the scrap heap.
It taxes the credulity of the layman to believe that wire is made
by pulling the cold steel of a rod, rolled down from a billet,
through a hole in a die of still harder steel. It sounds, again,
like invention, that by repetition of this process the metal of
a rod is spun down to a diameter of .018 of an inch, and at every
redrawing the steel is bathed and baked and cooled and tested
and new rejections made.
A REDUCTION OF 512,377 FOLD
When, at last, the wire making is finished the ingot has been reduced 512,377 fold, or in the proportion of over half a million to one. And the first thing that happens when the wire gets to the rope mill is a grilling test before it is sent to the stock bins.
Then, with what is left, the labor of rope making begins, the
drawn steel on its numberless spools whisking through the stranding
machines and squeezers, that twist it around its core, like so
much cotton yarn. The rope machines repeat the process with the
strands. In the special cables used to tether observation balloons,
and which have the thickness of a lead pencil but a strength measured
in tons, one finds at the center of the rope a core of copper
wire which serves for telephonic communication between the observer
and the ground.
The entire process from steel rod to finished wire, is long and
expensive, often requiring from six to eight weeks of unceasing
labor before the steel has been brought to its finished shape
and size. With multiplied demand on every hand for special rope
with new and unusual specifications, the wire committee of the
rope makers woke every morning with a new stunt before it and
a time limit on its performance that taxed every resource.
THE FIGHT FOR MATERIALS
The material problem was a steady fight, since good wire rope
can only be made from the best of open-hearth steel requiring
a special grade of pig iron with a low content of phosphorus and
sulphur. But the same quality of iron was required for shell steel,
and the makers of munitions were using it up at a rate never before
heard of. So the committees and the organizations behind them
worked at high tension, but in the matter of raw material they
were living from hand to mouth for months, in the effort to keep
abreast of deliveries.
SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS
The immense demand for the Mine Barrage was an extra task, and
the making of the rope, with a palpable decline in available labor,
was not the whole of the rope manufacturers' contribution. The
finishing involved work of a special character. The galvanizing
was necessarily superior to any used in ordinary production since
the rope was to lie under water for an indefinite length of time
and had to be proof against corrosion. If it had rusted off there
would have been a flock of TNT packages floating around the North
Sea, and wherever else its waters flowed, a tide-borne menace
to Allied shipping far more than to the enemy. In every plant
where rope was being produced a naval officer was stationed to
confer on the work as it progressed and to check up the output
with specifications both as to quality and delivery.
In a way, all hands were moving in the dark. The mine itself was
in many respects a new device, and was being turned out in vast
numbers practically without experimentation. The Government had
simply to gamble on the accuracy of its scientific deductions
and fix a productive schedule of so many mines a day.
There was a time, owing to the difficulties of transportation,
when one of the only two concerns able to manufacture aircraft
cable was supplying eighty per cent of it, and a great share of
other product besides. At one interval the crippling of either
the Roebling or American Steel and Wire plants would have proved
embarrassing, to say the least, to three of the largest and most
vital Government war projects.
With the requirement for rope, there were concomitant demands
for special preparation of the product for shipment, which included
its reduction to the lengths required for its various uses.
The plummet cords, for example, had to be cut by the makers to short lengths, dipped in fish oil, and attached to the steel plummet spools in such a way that the sudden stop at the required depth would
not tear them from the spool. This does not sound like so small
an item when it is considered that there was a total of 125,000
spools and that deliveries were at the rate of as high as 4,000
a day. All this work was done at the factories of the Roebling
Company and the American Steel & Wire Company.
In addition to this, the Roebling force attached about 500,000
sockets and hooks, at the rate of 6,000 a day, and supplied all
the four-legged lifting slings.
In all this work there was a constant change of program, necessitated
by the requirements and conditions of the minelaying forces. Endeavoring
to accomplish what had been thought impossible, the rope makers,
and for that matter the personnel of the Navy also who were engaged
on the rope problems, had to fall back on native ingenuity in
many junctures in order to overcome obstacles of all sorts which
constantly arose.
A FEVERISH TASK DONE RIGHT
All told, the making of wire rope for war purposes was a feverish
task, done in feverish haste, but done, nevertheless, on all sides
with marked efficiency and promptitude worthy of commemoration.
It will be noted from the following figures of production that this large volume of excess and highly specialized production was widely distributed throughout the United States; but the producers, and the committees who guided their production, have cause for self-congratulation in the fact that their output was assembled at the right place and at the required time for its great purpose, and that it did the work it was meant to do, in a manner that vindicated the effort of its makers:
| Feet of Wire Rope | |
| John A. Roebling's Sons Co., Trenton, N.J. | 27,363,200 |
| American Steel & Wire Co., \Vorcester, Mass | 22,948,270 |
| A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co., St. Louis, Mo | 10,503,000 |
| Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., St. Louis Mo | 4,241,380 |
| Hazard Mfg. Co., Wilkes-Barre, Pa | 3,975,950 |
| Macomber & Whyte Rope Co., Kenosha, Wis | 3,919,900 |
| Williarnsport Wire Rope Co., Williamsport, Pa | 2,982,600 |
| Waterbury Co., Brooklyn, N. Y. | 2,818,200 |
| Wright Wire Co., Worcester, Mass | 1,391,520 |
| Total | 80,244,020 |
| Feet of Wire Rope | |
| American Steel & Wire Co., Worcester, Mass | 4,995,000 |
| John A. Roebling's Sons Co., Trenton, N. J. | 4,473,000 |
| A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co., St. Louis, Mo | 1,875,000 |
| Hazard Mfg. Co., Wilkes-Barre, Pa | 1,110,000 |
| Macomber & Whyte Rope Co., Kenosha, Wis | 885,000 |
| Williamsport Wire Rope Co., Williamsport, Pa | 810,000 |
| Waterbury Co., Brooklyn, N. Y. | 420,000 |
| Wright Wire Co., Worcester, Mass | 330,000 |
| Upson & Walton | 255,000 |
| Total | 15,153,000 |